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W"12& classical pragmatism quickly became identi3ed with the theory of truth that domi-
nated critical discussions of it, both of its founders, Charles Sanders Peirce and William 
James, understood pragmatism essentially as a method. (4e so- called, “pragmatic theory 
of truth” was originally intended to just be an instance of that method’s application, albeit 
a very important one).) 4is pragmatic method plays a central role in Peirce’s )565 paper, 
“How to Make Our Ideas Clear”, but it was introduced to the wider philosophical commu-
nity (and 3rst introduced by that name) by James, who in an )575 lecture at the University 
of California at Berkley,8 presented the “principle of pragmatism” as the view(that:
To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what 
e9ects of a conceivably practical kind the object may involve— what sensations we are to 
expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these e9ects, then, is 
for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive signi3-
cance at(all.:
) When James de3ned pragmatism for Baldwin’s Dictionary in )7;8 (James )7;8b, p.(7<), there was 
no mention of any theory of truth, but by the time Pragmatism was published in )7;6, it was becoming 
clear that the name “pragmatism” was being used a label, not only for the pragmatic method, but 
also for the particular account of truth associated with Peirce, James, Dewey, and Schiller. James 
initially preferred keeping the term “pragmatism” for the method and Schiller’s term “humanism” 
for the theory of truth (see James’s )7;< letter to Schiller (in James )7;6, p.()=:), as well as his )7;< 
article “Humanism and Truth”, reprinted in James )7;7 (especially pages :6– :5)). However, by )7;6 
he seemed resigned to the fact that “pragmatism” was being used for both, so while he insisted that 
pragmatism “is a method only” (James )7;6, p.(:)), he admits that “the word “pragmatism” has come be 
used in a still wider sense, as meaning also a certain theory of truth” (James )7;6, pp.(:8– ::).
8 Published that same year by the University Chronicle as “Philosophical Conceptions and 
Practical Results” (James )575). Since the Chronicle was only circulated in the University of California 
system (aside from the :; reprints that James received), James published it again (in a slightly revised 
form) in !e Journal of Philosophy under the title “4e Pragmatic Method” (James()7;<).
: James )575, p.(8>7, James )7;<, p.()8<, )7;6, p.(87. Virtually the same passage appears in !e 
Varieties of Religious Experience (James )7;8a, p.(:>)), and for most of James’s contemporaries, that 
version would be their 3rst exposure to the(maxim.
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James focused primarily on how the principle (herea?er “the Pragmatic mMaxim”) could 
be applied to solving disputes, particularly philosophical ones. He famously re- introduces 
the maxim in his Pragmatism by describing his application of it on a camping trip to a 
debate between two groups of his friends about whether a man would be “going around” 
a squirrel that kept itself on the opposite side of tree that the man was circling. James sug-
gested that the answer “depends on what you practically mean by ‘going round’ the squir-
rel” ()7;6, p.(86). If you mean by “go round” being to the north, then to the west, then to 
the south, etc., then the man would have, while if you meant facing the squirrel’s front, 
then facing its side, then facing its back, etc., then the man would not have. Both groups 
predicted the same experiences from their seemingly opposing claims, so James concluded 
that their debate was idle. Of course, resolving one’s friends’ campground disputes is a 3ne 
thing to do, but James was most interested in the maxim’s application to “philosophical 
disputation”, where he expected it “wonderfully to smooth out misunderstandings and to 
bring peace” and to “yield a sovereignly valuable rule of method for discussion”.< As he puts 
it in Pragmatism:
4e pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that other-
wise might be interminable. Is the world one or many?— fated or free?— material or spir-
itual?— here are notions either of which may or may not hold good of the world; and disputes 
over such notions are unending. 4e pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret 
each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What di9erence would it prac-
tically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true? If no practical dif-
ference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and 
all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought to be able to show some practical 
di9erence that must follow from one side or the other’s being right.>
James goes on to claim(that:
It is astonishing to see how many philosophical disputes collapse into insigni3cance the 
moment you subject them to this simple test of tracing a concrete consequence. 4ere can be 
no di9erence anywhere that doesn’t make a di9erence elsewhere— no di9erence in abstract 
truth that doesn’t express itself in a di9erence in concrete fact and in conduct consequent 
upon that fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere and somewhen. 4e whole 
function of philosophy ought to be to 3nd out what de3nite di9erence it will make to you 
and me, at de3nite instants of our life, if this world formula or that world- formula be the 
true(one.=
James applies this method to the questions of whether the world has a material or spiritual 
origin,6 and whether reality is ultimately “one” or “many”,5 and to philosophical problems 
relating to substance,7 absolute idealism,); free will,)) possibility,)8 intentionality,): and, most 
famously, truth.)< In each of these, he hoped to support his thesis that in “every genuine 
metaphysical debate, some practical issue, however conjectural or remote, is involved”.)>
< James )575, p.(8>7, (also in James )7;<, p.()8<). > James, )7;6,(p.(85.
= James )7;6, p.(:;. (All but the last sentence also in James )575, p.(8=;, )7;<, pp.()8<– )8>).
6 James )575, p.(8=;, )7;<, p.()8>, )7;6,(p.(>;. 5 James )7;6,(p.(=:.
7 James )7;6,(p.(<>. ); James )7;6,(p.(<). )) James )7;6,(p.(=;.
)8 James )7;6, p.():=. ): James )7;7,(p.(=5.
)< James )7;6,(ch.(=. )> James )7;6,(p.(>8.
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Unfortunately, the application of James’s method to philosophical cases proved far less 
successful than its application to his friends’ campground dispute. Indeed, there remains 
a surprising amount of disagreement about just what the maxim James proposes actually 
is. In particular, there has been a considerable lack of clarity about just what sort of “signi3-
cance” James is talking about, and most prominently, just what he means by “practical con-
sequences”.)= 4ere have been a number of interpretations of the Maxim, of which four of 
the most central are:(the “Peircian” reading, the “activist” reading, the “subjectivist” read-
ing, and 3nally the “practical” reading. While some of these readings have advantages over 
others (both in terms of exegetical plausibility and fruitfulness of the resulting maxim), 
none have proved entirely satisfactory, and so it is not surprising that contemporary philos-
ophers inclined to describe themselves as pragmatists do so for reasons other than a com-
mitment to any version of the Pragmatic(Maxim.
1.! T,- “P-(#/($*” R-$+(*%
A natural reading of James’s Pragmatic Maxim would be to take it to be essentially the 
one that Peirce introduced in )565. James certainly encourages this when he introduces the 
maxim not only as “the principle of pragmatism” but at the same time as “the principle of 
Peirce”,)6 and James’s maxim does seem remarkably similar to Peirce’s now familiar claim 
that in order to attain the third grade of clearness)5 with our ideas(we:
Consider what e9ects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the 
object of our conception to have. 4en our conception of these e9ects is the whole of our 
conception of the object.)7
On the Peircian reading of the Pragmatic Maxim, the “signi3cance” involved is cognitive 
signi3cance, and the cognitive content of a philosophical view is to be understood in terms 
of the “practical e9ects” (in particular, the experiences) that would follow from its(truth.
It was certainly this reading that led many to view the Pragmatic Maxim as being a vari-
ant of the ‘veri3cationist’ accounts of meaning that were beginning to gain traction in the 
early part of the twentieth century,8; and it is unsurprising that the two were o?en viewed 
)= Indeed, such di9erences are o?en understood as explaining the di9erence between (in the 
terminology of Rescher 8;;;, pp.(=<– >) the “pragmatism of the right” associated with writers like 
Peirce, C.(I. Lewis, Haack, and Rescher himself, and the “pragmatism of the le?” associated with 
James, Schiller, and Rorty. For a similar narrative seeing these two strains coming out from the 
interpretation of the pragmatic maxim, see also Mounce )776 and Misak(8;):.
)6 4e maxim is so described in James )575, p.(8>7, )7;8a, p.(:>), )7;<, p.()8<, and )7;6,(p.(87.
)5 4e 3rst two grades coming from familiarity and explicit de3nitions (Peirce )565, p.()8=).
)7 Peirce )565, p.():8. This “method of ascertaining the meaning of hard words and of abstract 
concepts” is later identified by Peirce as “pragmatism”, and, like James, Peirce prefers to 
think of pragmatism as a method only, rather than a “doctrine of metaphysics” or “attempt to 
determine any truth of things” (Peirce )7;6, p.(<;;). Peirce, of course, modified and clarified his 
presentation of the maxim in the years that followed (for a discussion of this, see Hookway 8;;<, 
Misak(8;):).
8; See Soames,  chapter(: of.
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as notional variants of the same basic view.8) Indeed, provided that one understood “prac-
tical consequences” to simply be “perceptual consequences”, it would be hard to see how 
the two maxims di9ered. Furthermore, in Peirce’s own hands, pragmatism had a notice-
able “anti- metaphysical” tone. While James emphasized how the pragmatic method would 
allow us to resolve many philosophical disputes, Peirce at times seemed more inclined to 
treat pragmatism as a method to separate the problems that were intellectually tractable 
from the ones that were, ultimately, nonsense.88 When he asked himself what he expected 
of pragmatism, Peirce provided an answer that would not have seemed out of place in the 
Vienna Circle:
It will serve to show that almost every proposition of ontological metaphysics is either 
meaningless gibberish . . . or else downright absurd; so that all such rubbish being swept 
away, what will remain of philosophy will be a series of problems capable of investigation by 
the observational methods of the true sciences.
(Peirce )7;>, p.(::5)
While the more expansive notion of experience that Peirce endorses allows him to take 
a di9erent line on the meaning of mathematical sentences than the positivists,8: the 
Pragmatic Maxim, understood in this Peircian fashion, faces a number of challenges simi-
lar to those faced by defenders of veri3cationist theories of meaning.
One such problem is that by tying the cognitive content of a statement to what prac-
tical e9ects we should expect if it were true, the Peircian interpretation of the maxim 
seems to leave without signi3cance, statements about the past that don’t have predicted 
consequences for the future. If I(claim that Plato stubbed his toe )5(days before his elev-
enth birthday, the claim certainly seems meaningful, but it seems unlikely that there 
are any particular experiences that we can expect from it. Of course, Peirce insists that 
“it is unphilosophical to suppose that, with regard to any given question (which has 
any clear meaning), investigation would not bring forth a solution of it, were it car-
ried far enough”,8< but most of us would be more skeptical about whether such cases 
would bring forth any such solution. Further, even in those cases where we have such 
predicted e9ects, the maxim still suggests that such statements are, in some sense, 
really about the future. If I(claim that a large meteor landed );,;;;(years ago where 
Toronto is now located, there may be future experiences (about, say, how an excavation 
would turn out) that this would predict, but to say that those predictions are the entire 
8) Ayer, for instance, claims that “Peirce’s pragmatic maxim is indeed identical, for all practical 
purposes, with the physicalist interpretation of the veri3cation principle” (Ayer )7=5, p.(<>). See 
also Lewis )7:<, p.(=>, Carnap )7:=, p.()8:, and Reichenbach )7:5, p.(<7. (For an account stressing the 
di9erences between the Peircian and the veri3cationist maxims, see Misak()77>.)
88 However, see Peirce )7;> (p.(::7) on how, unlike other “prope- positivist” theories, his maxim 
allows one to extract the “precious essence” of metaphysics (particularly as it relates to the nature of 
signs and categorical schemes). For a discussion of this, see Nagl 8;;<, p.():, Haack 8;;=, p.()<>.
8: 4ere is good reason to think that Peirce had much more than sensations in mind when he spoke 
of experience. In particular, he speaks not only of “external” experiences (of which sensation would be 
paradigmatic) but also of “internal” experiences, which would include, for instances, the experiences 
we have when engaged in a mathematical proof or manipulation of a geometrical diagram when doing 
a mathematical proof. (For a discussion of this, see Misak 8;):, p.(<8.)
8< Peirce )565, p.()<;.
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signi3cance8> of my statement seems to leave out the fact that it is essentially a claim 
about what happened );,;;;(years ago, not about what would happen if you took soil 
samples in Toronto tomorrow.
James seems willing to bite such bullets when he argues (in an example that will come 
up again) that, if there were no future, the dispute between those who think that God cre-
ated the world and those who think that it resulted from “blind physical forces”8= would (if 
both theories could explain all of our current experience)86 be “purely verbal”, and that “the 
two theories, in spite of their di9erent- sounding names, mean exactly the same thing”.85 It 
is only because we have a future that such a debate between the theist and materialist is a 
signi3cant one. 4e materialist is, according to James, committed to all life in the universe 
eventually perishing (and all of our accomplishments and values going unremembered), 
while the theist predicts that our values will be preserved even if we, as individuals, die out. 
As James puts it, “Materialism means simply the denial that the moral order is eternal, and 
the cutting o9 of ultimate hopes; spiritualism means the aFrmation of an eternal moral 
order and the letting loose of hope.”87
Another problem for the “Peircian” version of the Pragmatic Maxim is that it may seem 
that normative statements about they way things ought to be (rather than how they are) 
will not come out as meaningful when the maxim is applied to them. Such statements seem 
to have no predictive import, which would suggest that no practical consequences follow 
from their truth. 4ere may be, for instance, nothing we can predict from the truth of a 
statement like “eating meat is wrong”, since we may very well continue to eat meat forever 
in spite of its being wrong. 4eir denial of cognitive value to ethical statements was a famil-
iar objection to veri3cationist theories of meaning, and it seems to be a fair charge against 
the “Peircian” reading of the Pragmatic Maxim as well.(:;
4e Peircian version of the maxim is not, then, without serious problems, and one 
might ask whether other readings of the maxim might fare better. James claimed that 
his maxim was essentially Peirce’s, but he also suggested that the maxim should be 
“expressed more broadly” than Peirce did,:) and most subsequent writers have taken 
James to have understated his di9erences with Peirce. 4at certainly seemed to be the 
view of Peirce himself, and his evident dissatisfaction with how his original maxim was 
developed by James can be seen is his suggestion that his own view (and its “poor little 
8> As Peirce and James stated above, “our conception of these e9ects is the whole of our conception 
of the object” (Peirce )565, p.():8), and “[o] ur conception of these e9ects, then, is for us the whole of our 
conception of the object” (James )575, p.(8>7, James )7;<, p.()8<, )7;6, p.(87).
8= James, )7;6,(p.(>;.
86 James explicitly assumes that both positions are equally successful at explaining how things 
stand now (James )7;6, p.(>)).
85 James )7;6, pp.(>;– >).
87 James )7;6, p.(>>. James, however, quickly came to have doubts about this purported equivalence, 
even without these future considerations (James )7;7, p();:).
:; Of course, it isn’t clear whether Peirce himself intended his maxim to apply to our ethical 
concepts, since he insisted that pragmatism was “a method of ascertaining the meanings, not of all 
ideas, but only of what I(call ‘intellectual concepts’, that is to say, of those upon the structure of which, 
arguments concerning objectivity may hinge” (Peirce )7;6, p.(<8)). 4at said, some (such as Misak 
8;;;, 8;):)(have argued that ethical claims can be worked into a Peircian framework.
:) James )575, p.(8>7.
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maxim”):8 be renamed “pragmaticism” in order to distinguish it from the “pragmatism” 
that was by then associated with James.::
Indeed, James’s pragmatic maxim has o?en been read in ways that are radically di9erent 
from Peirce’s.
2.! T,- ‘A/'(3()'’ R-$+(*%
One way to do this is to read James’s principle as not proposing a conception of cognitive 
signi3cance at all. Rather, the maxim is just read as a way of sorting those philosophical 
questions that are worth pursuing from those that are not. As Kitcher recently put(it:
James and Dewey share [with the Logical Positivists] the wish to eliminate “insigni3cant 
questions” from philosophy— but the apparent communion of goals depends on a bad pun. 
‘Signi3cance’ for them has nothing to do with semantics, or with a veri3cationist approach 
to meaning:(they are out to focus philosophy on issues that matter to people.:<
On this reading, the Pragmatic Maxim is just an injunction for us to move, as Dewey 
famously put it, from the “problems of philosophers” to “the problems of men”,:> and in 
which we do not “solve” philosophical problems, “we get over them”.:= 4e maxim thus 
comes out as something closer to the sort of principle one 3nds Rorty applying when he 
claims that for pragmatists like himself “the traditional questions of metaphysics and epis-
temology can be neglected”, not because they are “devoid of meaning” or “rest on false 
premises” but because “they have no social utility” since “the vocabulary of metaphysics 
and epistemology is of no practical use.”:6 James might di9er from Rorty and Dewey about 
just how much juice could still be squeezed from traditional philosophical problems,:5 but 
on this reading, all three would agree that pragmatism involved shi?ing one’s focus to the 
problems which were of “vital” importance.:7
4ere are passages in James that can certainly encourage such a reading, as when he 
claims:
[M] ost men instinctively . . . do turn their backs on philosophical disputes from which noth-
ing in the line of de3nite future consequences can be seen to follow. 4e verbal and empty 
character of philosophy is surely a reproach with which we are but too familiar. If pragma-
tism be true, it is a perfectly sound reproach unless the theories under 3re can be shown to 
have alternative practical outcomes, however delicate and distant these may be. 4e com-
mon man and the scientist say they discover no such outcomes, and if the metaphysician 
can discern none either, the others certainly are in the right of it, as against him. His science 
:8 Peirce )7;5, p.(<<5. :: Peirce )7;>, pp.(::<– >.
:< Kitcher 8;)8, pp. xii– xiii. (See also Kitcher 8;)8, p.(xvii.)
:> Dewey, )7)6, p.(7>. (See also Dewey, )78>,(p.(6.) := Dewey, )7;7,(p.(<;.
:6 Rorty, 8;;6b, pp.(:6– 5. Of course, Rorty would certainly not refer to this as “a method”.
:5 Unlike Rorty and the positivists, James believed that the traditional philosophical questions did 
have practical import (see Nagl 8;;<, p.(8;).
:7 4is contrasts with Peirce who, at least at times, thought that the application of the Pragmatic 
Method was particularly inappropriate for such “vital” questions (though see Misak 8;):, p.(<>).
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is then but pompous triGing; and the endowment of a professorship for such a being would 
be(silly.
(James )7;6,(p.(>8)
Further, such a reading of James is almost as old as pragmatism itself, and can be traced 
back to Lovejoy’s argument that James’s maxim ultimately gives us neither the “intellectual 
meaning” nor the “logical validity” of propositions, but rather their “moral worth” and 
“human signi3cance”.<; According to Lovejoy, James conGated the question of which top-
ics were worth studying with the question which topics were meaningful at all, and mistak-
enly transformed “a strong conviction concerning the relative importance of propositions 
into a logical doctrine concerning the import of propositions.”<)
4is “activist” reading makes the maxim’s focus on the future seem less problematic, 
since it is more plausible to claim that disputes that have no consequences for future experi-
ence are idle, than it is to say that they are meaningless.<8 On this reading, the maxim isn’t 
intended to produce anything like reductive de3nitions or complete accounts of meaning. 
Rather, the maxim is meant to specify that part of meaning that is useful for philosophical 
purposes, since the point is to get the part of meaning relevant to debate. 4e “veri3cation 
transcendent” part of meaning may be there, but not a part of meaning that helps us settle 
the issue. If we are actually going to debate whether Plato stubbed his toe )5(days before his 
eleventh birthday, then consequences of the sort the maxim emphasizes will be needed. If 
no such consequences can be found, debate on the issue is futile.
However, the activist reading makes James’s choice of the maxim itself, and what he 
wants to do with it, fairly mysterious. First of all, the activist reading treats the principle 
as one for sorting those philosophical problems that are worth pursuing from those that 
are not, but James seemed to consistently describe pragmatism as a method for solving 
philosophical disputes, not one for deciding whether or not a dispute was worth pursuing. 
Secondly, if one wanted to simply switch our focus to problems that made a signi3cant dif-
ference to our lives, it’s hard to imagine that one would choose to do so with a maxim of the 
sort that James formulates. One needs a lot more to settle whether a question is “idle” than 
just whether its answer makes some di9erence to “somebody, somehow, somewhere and 
somewhen”,<: since anything that has any experiential consequences will make such a dif-
ference. If the “activist” reading were what James wanted, the principle would have been a 
terrible way to express it. Even manifestly trivial questions such as “Is there an even or odd 
number of grains of sand in my nephew’s sandbox?” can be tied to some di9erence in future 
experience, so the maxim seems ill suited for separating those questions which are “idle” 
from those which are(not.
None of this is to deny that James might have a good deal of sympathy with the 
Dewey/ Rorty/ Kitcher position that we should focus on problems that make a di9erence 
<; Lovejoy )7;5b,(p.(>=. <) Lovejoy )7;5b,(p.(>7.
<8 Such a reading stresses passages of James such as “if no future detail of experience or conduct is 
to be deduced from our hypothesis, the debate between materialism and theism becomes quite idle 
and insigni3cant. Matter and God in that event mean exactly the same thing— the power, namely, 
neither more nor less, that could make just this completed world— and the wise man is he who in such 
a case would turn his back on such a supererogatory discussion” ()7;6, p.(>8).
<: James )7;6,(p.(:;.
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to our lives:(it’s only to note that this sympathy wasn’t what he was expressing with his 
Pragmatic(Maxim.
4.! T,- S567-/'(3()' R-$+(*%
4is leads to a surprisingly popular explanation of how James’s maxim opens things up 
from the original “Peircian” version. On this reading of James, he proposes that we take the 
content of a philosophical view to be the practical consequences not (only) of its being true, 
but (also) of our believing"it.<<
4is “subjectivist” reading of the maxim is obviously more forgiving than the Peircian 
one about which questions would be meaningful. It would, for instance, have an easy time 
allowing ethical statements to be meaningful, since one’s ethical beliefs can a9ect one’s 
behavior in a fairly straightforward way. While the truth of the statement “eating meat is 
always wrong” might not entail any experiences on our part, it seems clear that believing 
it has practical consequences in terms of what we will and won’t do because of that belief. 
On such an account, “Eating meat is always wrong” would be meaningful at least in part 
because my believing it would lead me to stop eating meat (or at least eat it(less).
In much the same way, the subjectivist reading doesn’t have the problem of potentially 
treating claims like “Plato stubbed his toe )5(days before his eleventh birthday” as mean-
ingless. I’m not sure what di9erence it could make to my future experience if that claim 
were true, but it seems pretty clear what sort of di9erences there could be if I(believed it. In 
particular, it would make a di9erence to what I(would answer if asked, “Do you think that 
Plato stubbed his toe )5(days before his eleventh birthday?”
4ese small advantages, however, are a consequence of one of the major downsides of 
the subjectivist reading of the maxim— namely, on such a reading every claim is going to 
not only be meaningful, but also have a distinct meaning. Every belief will have some con-
sequences that follow from believing it for someone, and no two beliefs will have the same 
consequences for everyone. “John bought a female fox” and “John bought a vixen” have 
distinct meanings because answering “yes” to the question “Did John buy a fox?” is likely 
to follow from believing the 3rst, while it may be less likely to follow from believing the 
second. 4e subjectivist reading thus allows so much that the maxim is completely stripped 
of its teeth. James claims that many disputes would collapse into insigni3cance once sub-
jected to this test,<> but it seems as if no dispute would be “purely verbal” if the subjective 
e9ects of believing were allowed to determine the contents of the beliefs involved.
Given how problematic the resulting view is, it is surprising how little textual evidence 
there is that James endorsed this more “subjective” interpretation of the maxim. Indeed, 
when James presents the maxim, the formulations he gives invariably favor a reading that 
<< For recent versions of this interpretive strain, see, for instance, Bacon 8;)8, p.(85, De Waal 8;;>, 
p.(8), Hookway 8;);, p.(5, Misak 8;):, p.(>5, Rescher 8;;;, p.(7, Suckiel 8;;=, p.(::, Tallise and Aiken 
8;;5, pp.())– ): (It is also suggested by Brandom’s claim that for James, Peirces’s principle, amounts to 
the claim that “the meaning of a claim is the di9erence that adopting it would make to what one does” 
(Brandom 8;)), p.(8;).).
<> James )7;6,(p.(:;.
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ties content to the practical e9ects of the sentence’s truth rather than our believing it.<= By 
contrast, there are no explicit formulations of the maxim where James states, or even sug-
gests, that the consequences of believing the sentence to be the relevant(ones.
So what reason could there be for ascribing the subjective reading of the maxim to James? 
Lovejoy 3rst suggested such a reading in )7;5, and (at least partially because it 3ts other pre-
conceptions readers would have about James),<6 many subsequent writers on James seemed 
happy to just follow Lovejoy’s lead on this issue. In that article, Lovejoy argues<5 that James 
must have something like the subjectivistic version of the maxim in mind, since ())(James 
takes absolute idealism<7 not to involve any predictions about our future experiences:
[the Absolute] remains supremely indi9erent to what the particular facts in our world actu-
ally are. Be they what they may, the Absolute will father them. . . . You cannot redescend 
into the world of particulars by the Absolute’s aid, or deduce any necessary consequences of 
detail important for your life from your idea of his nature.
(James )7;6, p.(<;, italics(mine)
and (8), James suggests that claims about the Absolute are still meaningful because of the 
emotional and spiritual comfort they(bring:
the use of the Absolute is proved by the whole course of men’s religious history . . . it is indeed 
not a scienti#c use, for we can make no particular deductions from it. It is emotional and 
spiritual altogether.
(James )7;6(p.():), italics(mine)
However, the focus of these passages that Lovejoy appeals to is on a lack of detailed par-
ticular predictions, not a lack of consequences at all,>; and the mere fact that there are no 
particular “scienti3c” deductions of future experiences that follow from our commitment 
to the Absolute does not entail that we wouldn’t still be committed to there being a con-
crete di9erence in some (as yet unspeci3ed) future experience. When we look what James 
actually says about the Absolute right a?er he claims that we can’t deduce any particular 
consequences from it, he clearly commits himself to the truth of the belief in the Absolute 
entailing a di9erence in what would be experienced— it’s just that there are no details about 
either the timeframe or the general form of the good turn of events entailed, and thus no 
speci3c predictions. As he puts(it:
What do believers in the Absolute mean by saying that their belief a9ords them comfort? 4ey 
mean that since in the Absolute 3nite evil is “overruled” already, we may, therefore, whenever 
<= See, for instance, James )7;8a, p.(:>), James )7;8b, p.(7<, James )7;6, pp, 85, 87, :;, James )7;7, 
p.(:6, James()7);.
<6 James wrote extensively about the practical consequences of our beliefs, and it is a common 
understanding of his “4e Will to Believe” (James )57=a) to take it to focus on the practical bene3ts 
that come from believing in God (in contrast to Pascal who focused on the practical bene3ts associated 
with the belief ’s truth), and so it can be tempting to read such concerns of his into his understanding of 
the Pragmatic(Maxim.
<5 Lovejoy )7;5a,(p.(7.
<7 4e “absolute” being shorthand for the views James attributes to “absolute idealists” like Royce 
and Bradley who took the world to be fundamentally a single whole that was, ultimately organized in 
the best of all possible ways (See Royce )55>, Bradley()57:).
>; For a good discussion of this, see Sukiel )758,(ch.(:.
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we wish, treat the temporal as if it were potentially the eternal, be sure that we can trust its 
outcome, and, without sin, dismiss our fear and drop the worry of our 3nite responsibility. In 
short, they mean that we have a right ever and anon to take a moral holiday, to let the world wag 
in its own way, feeling that its issues are in better hands than ours and are none of our business.
(James )7;6,(p.(<))
Now it seems from this passage James’s position is that while we can’t deduce any particular 
consequences from our belief in the Absolute, we can take “moral holidays” if we believe 
in it because we can infer that things will work out for the best no matter what we do our-
selves. 4e psychological consequences of believing it are important, but they follow from 
a conclusion about what the total sum of experiences will be like if the hypothesis is(true.
4at said, most of the problems with the subjective reading discussed above stem from 
the fact that it focuses on the e9ects that a belief does have on a believer’s behavior, rather 
than what e9ects it should have.>) If the subjective maxim were read a more normative way, 
many of the problems with the descriptive version of the subjective maxim would disap-
pear. For instance, how we should behave if we believed that there was a vixen in the forest 
is no di9erent than how we should behave if we believed that there was a female fox there, 
even if the actual behavior produced was di9erent.
Such a normative reading would also allow one to avoid another serious problem for 
the descriptive version:(the subjective interpretation of the maxim— namely, that it seems 
to make it hard to attribute any general content to a philosophical view because just what 
a belief will lead someone to do varies from person to person. For instance, while James 
argues that a belief in the Absolute can justify an occasional moral holiday, he couldn’t (if 
the descriptive– subjective reading were right) claim that the content of the Absolute is such 
a right to take moral holidays unless he had grounds for thinking that this was the actual 
e9ect that believing in the Absolute had for most people. If people mistakenly thought that 
the Absolute required moral seriousness on their part and behaved accordingly, then that 
would be the content for them. On the other hand, with the more normative reading of the 
subjective version of the maxim, James can claim that the content of the Absolute is that 
we can take moral holidays because that is what we should be able to do if we believed in the 
Absolute, even if such a belief didn’t actually incline us to take such holidays.
4is normative reading of the subjective version of the maxim still runs into the prob-
lem that James did seem to focus on the consequences of a claim’s truth rather than the 
consequences of our believing it, but it does point towards yet another interpretation of 
the maxim, one that avoids that problem while incorporating much of what the normative 
subjective version of the maxim hoped to capture.
8.! T,- P#$/'(/$9 R-$+(*%
While the subjectivist reading has serious problems, there is something to its treating the 
maxim as tying meaning to our forthcoming actions as well as our sensations, and there 
are ways of doing this without moving to the subjectivist reading itself.
>) See Gale 8;);, p.()); for a useful discussion of the “normative” vs. the “causal” phrasings of the 
maxim in(James.
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In particular, when James speaks of “what e9ects of a conceivably practical kind the 
object may involve”, he refers not only to “what sensations we are to expect from it”, but also 
to “what reactions we must prepare.”>8 Now, it is a real question what this second aspect is 
supposed to add to the 3rst. When he summarizes the Principle in !e Varieties of Religious 
Experience, this second aspect is cashed out in terms of “what conduct it is 3tted to pro-
duce” and “what conduct we must prepare in case the object should be true”, and while it 
is easy to conclude that every di9erence in predicted sensation will produce a di9erence 
in the set of actions called for, it is conceivable that there could be a di9erence in actions 
called for without there being a di9erence in predicted sensation. For instance, it is easy to 
read these as allowing room for normative claims to have meaning because their truth is 
“3tted” to produce conduct that is in line with them. “Eating meat is wrong” has a di9erent 
meaning from “Eating meat is right” because “the conduct we must prepare” in the former 
precludes eating meat, while the “conduct we must prepare” in the latter includes the pos-
sibility of eating it. 4e second type of practical e9ect that James mentions in his Pragmatic 
Maxim thus makes the view more forgiving than both Peirce’s version or the positivist cri-
terion of meaning.>:
The resulting view is “normative” in that it focuses on what the belief is “fitted” to 
produce. That is, it focuses on what we should do if the belief were true, not simply 
on what we might actually do if we accept it as true.>< Still, it should also be clear why 
emphasizing this sort of practical consequence could make one’s position sound like 
the subjective version of the maxim. The actions one should engage in if a sentence 
were true often are the actions one should engage in if you believed it, and so an appeal 
to those actions or attitudes can look as if one is appealing to the effects of believing 
the sentence rather than any practical consequence that follows from its truth. For 
instance, in the example of the Absolute that has been given, the view would be that 
a “practical effect” of the truth of the claims associated with the Absolute would be 
that we are entitled to take moral holidays. There is nothing subjectivist about this, 
but it is easy to confuse with the subjectivist view that understands the meaning of the 
Absolute as stemming from the fact that we will be more likely to take moral holidays 
if we believe in it. On this reading, if the truth of absolute idealism didn’t legitimize 
moral holidays, then the fact that people who believed in it actually felt entitled to 
such holidays would be irrelevant to its meaning.
>8 James )575, p.(8>7, James )7;<, p.()8<, )7;6, p.(87. 4is is perhaps expressed most clearly in the 
de3nition of pragmatism James provides for Baldwin’s Dictionary:(“4e doctrine that the whole 
meaning of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences, consequences either in the shape 
of conduct to be recommended, or in that of experiences to be expected, if the conception be true” 
(James )7;8b, p.(7<).
>: It would also underwrite James’s insistence (James )7;7, p.();:) that the pragmatist must 
recognize the di9erence between a “spiritually animated maiden” and an “automated sweetheart” 
(a “soulless body” that was “absolutely indistinguishable” from the former), since the reactions 
appropriate to one need not be appropriate to the(other.
>< Of course, just what conduct is recommended by the truth of a claim will (as stressed in Brandom 
8;)), p.(>;) depend on what the individual desires, and this will produce, not only a more expansive 
holism than the sort associated with the Peircian version, but will also be more individualistic, 
since the desires in question will vary from individual to individual more than the predicted 
experiences(would.
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We can see how this works in James’s discussion of the Eucharist. While Peirce explicitly 
states that the Pragmatic Maxim shows that debates about the Eucharist are without sig-
ni3cance,>> James seems to take the opposite line, namely:
Substance here would appear to have momentous pragmatic value. Since the accidents of 
the wafer don’t change in the Lord’s supper, and yet it has become the very body of Christ, it 
must be that the change is in the substance solely. 4e bread- substance must have been with-
drawn, and the divine substance substituted miraculously without altering the immediate 
sensible properties. But tho these don’t alter, a tremendous di9erence has been made, no less 
a one than this, that we who take the sacrament, now feed upon the very substance of divin-
ity. 4e substance- notion breaks into life, then, with tremendous e9ect.
(James )7;6, pp.(<=– 6)
James notably, and rather unhelpfully, doesn’t say what the “tremendous e9ect” in this case 
is supposed to be. Since the accidents are the same, it is o?en assumed that the “practi-
cal e9ects” of the switch in substance cannot be objective, and this has led to a reading 
of Peirce and James in which Peirce takes talk of transubstantiation to be meaningless 
because no experiential consequences follow from its truth, while James takes such talk 
to be meaningful because of the mental comfort and satisfaction that comes from believ-
ing in it. However, on the reading suggested here the di9erence comes, not from the psy-
chological e9ects of believing in transubstantiation, but rather from the acts and attitudes 
normatively required by the bread and wine becoming “the very substance of the divin-
ity”. Di9ering attitudes towards the Host’s desecration, whether one should genuGect to the 
Host on the altar upon entering the church, how one should treat extra communion wafers 
can seem to be demanded by the truth of the various views of transubstantiation, and this 
accounts for their di9erence in meaning for(James.
4e practical reading of the maxim thus allows for pairs of claims to have distinct mean-
ings, even if they entail the same future experiences,>= but the added 3neness of grain that 
comes from focusing on “the conduct we must prepare” is also a vital part of determin-
ing the meaning of our philosophical claims for James, because he believes that, just as 
much as with the sensations predicted, the more “practical” side of a philosophical position 
will ultimately determine whether it is acceptable or not. As he puts it early on in his “4e 
Sentiment of Rationality”, if two conceptions of the world are equally consistent and both 
account for the available evidence, “that one which awakens the active impulses, or satis3es 
other æsthetic demands better than the other, will be accounted the more rational concep-
tion, and will deservedly prevail”.>6
Indeed, James o?en ties his discussion of various philosophical questions that may 
seem at bottom “metaphysical” (free will vs. determinism, materialism vs. theism, mon-
ism vs. pluralism) to the practical conclusions that one should draw from such competing 
positions (e.g. giving up hope if materialism is true, being complacent if idealism is true). 
Such an argumentative gambit can o?en seem like engaging in a kind of wishful thinking 
>> Peirce )565, pp.():)– 8.
>= However, James’s independent commitment to radical empiricism (particularly its postulate that 
“the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things de3nable in terms drawn 
from experience” (James )7;7, p.(=)) may temper his ability to appeal to this aspect of the(maxim.
>6 James )558, p.(==. One should note that, in spite of his criticism of James’s views on the “4e 
Will to Believe”, Peirce arguably moves in this direction when he claims that the “ultimate test” of a 
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(drawing metaphysical conclusions from what one wants to be true), but it may just as well 
be that James is arguing that in these cases (which he consistently claims to be empirically 
underdetermined), such practical considerations, whether we like it or not, o?en deter-
mine the views we adopt. Focusing merely on the experiences predicted, rather than the 
more normative expectations, however, obscures these deciding factors and makes the 
debates seem more intractable than they really are. Spelling out philosophical views in 
terms of the practical version of the Pragmatic Maxim puts these practical considerations, 
which are always (even if just subconsciously) motivating, into the foreground so that they 
can be targets of rational scrutiny as(well.
4is aspect of James’s method, that of making the subjective engines driving our phil-
osophical views explicit (and thus subject to rational evaluation) is far removed from 
simply endorsing wishful thinking. Rather, it involves recognizing that such “subjective” 
factors will inevitably a9ect what views we ultimately adopt, and that it is thus best to 
have them subject to criticism, since the practical upshot we actually draw from a philo-
sophical view may not be the one that we should draw from it. (As when the absolute 
idealist thinks that his or her view underwrites a type of moral seriousness, while James 
argues that it actually legitimates a type of moral complacency.) If our practical demands 
help determine which views (among those that pass basic logical muster) we will ulti-
mately accept, making the practical consequences of various philosophical views explicit 
can go a long way towards settling philosophical disputes, because we can, for instance, 
())(see what ultimately makes a view like absolute idealism appealing, and (8)(argue for a 
replacement for it that captures those appealing aspects as well (which James claims his 
form of meleoristic pluralism(does).
One problem>5 with this version of the maxim is that explaining the meaning of our 
claims in terms of such normative consequences means that the claims themselves can’t be 
used to explain why we are committed to doing what we do. It might seem that we should, 
for instance, genuGect in front of the Host because it is literally the body of Christ, but if 
what distinguishes the meaning of that claim from the more symbolic interpretation of 
the Eucharist just is the set of normative consequences which includes genuGection, not 
throwing out unused communion wafers, etc., then the attempt to explain why we should 
genuGect in front of the Host in terms of that claim seems circular. (Of course, something 
like this worry is present for the “Peircian” reading as well, and one might think that the 
fact that explaining the meaning of “a large meteor landed );,;;;(years ago where Toronto 
is now located” in terms of future experiences, would similarly preclude our explaining 
why we would 3nd a crater formation under the soil around Toronto in terms of a meteor 
having landed there );,;;;(years(ago.)
One might be able to assuage this worry by claiming that the maxim isn’t, strictly speak-
ing, intended to provide meaning equivalences (which was, as a self- standing problem, the 
sort of issue that James was comparatively unconcerned with), but is just meant to cap-
ture the fact that to clearly understand a claim, you need to know what follows from its 
truth. Indeed, James’s and Peirce’s shared suggestion that “the whole of our conception of 
hypothesis “must lie in its value in the self- controlled growth of a man’s conduct in life” (Peirce )7;5, 
p.(<<=).
>5 Which I’d like to thank an anonymous referee for this volume for stressing.
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the object” is “our conception of these [practical] e9ects”>7 could be understood as com-
patible with this more modest reading. Even if the maxim didn’t produce full meaning- 
equivalencies, capturing how things would be di9erent if one claim rather than another 
were true could still do much the same work in helping settle philosophical disputes.
Even so, as a philosophical method, the practical version of the maxim brings with it 
problems of its own. In particular, the normative matters that determine “the conduct we 
must prepare” can be controversial, o?en more so than the views that they are supposed to 
explain, and so using such predictions to elucidate the meaning of a controversial subject 
can seem quixotic at best. Indeed, by the time he published !e Meaning of Truth, it was 
quite clear to James that most, if not all, of his interlocutors did not accept his proposed 
explications of the meanings of their views.=; What James took to be the essential practical 
upshot of various philosophical views were taken to be at best peripheral by their defenders.
A?er all, the normative consequences that come with, say, the di9erent cosmologies 
James considers are themselves far from obvious. Not only because the empirical conse-
quences of such cosmologies are hard to predict, but also because how one should react 
even if one could be sure of those consequences is open to debate. For instance, when James 
claims that “Materialism means simply the denial that the moral order is eternal, and the 
cutting o9 of ultimate hopes”,=) he is working with particular assumptions about what a 
materialist cosmology must look like (namely, that all of the stars must burn out and all life 
die out), and someone who didn’t share such assumptions wouldn’t view “materialism” as 
having such a meaning at all. 4e pessimism comes not, then, from materialism itself, but 
from certain (admittedly plausible, but ultimately optional) assumptions about what a sci-
enti3c cosmology must predict for our future.
Furthermore, even if he could be assured that materialism did entail that all conscious 
life would permanently die out, James’s pessimistic and somewhat depressive attitude 
towards the universe burning out in the far, far distant future isn’t shared by all,=8 and 
deciding the question of whether there is any point to our actions if no one will be there 
to remember them in a million years isn’t obviously an easier question to settle than the 
question of whether God created our world. While there is much to be said for making 
the practical consequences of our views as explicit as possible, just what those practical 
consequences are is o?en itself subject to philosophical dispute.
In conclusion, then, each version of the Pragmatic Maxim brings with it a range of prob-
lems, so it should not be surprising that while there are many philosophers today who iden-
tify themselves as “pragmatists”, it is not because they endorse any version of the method 
that Peirce and James initially identi3ed with the(view.
>7 Peirce )565, p.():8, James )575, p.(8>7, James )7;<, p.()8<, )7;6,(p.(87. =; James )7;7,(p.(>.
=) James, )7;6,(p.(>>.
=8 It is more characteristic of what he calls the “sick soul” rather than the “healthy minded” (see 
James )7;8a, ch. <– 6), and his assertion that the sick soul simply has a deeper and wider appreciation 
of reality (James )7;8a, ):=– 5) is largely undefended. He mentions that only the sick soul is aware of 
the evils that are really there, but gives no reason to think that the healthy minded couldn’t be aware of 
such evils as well (other than that they are not as bothered by them as the sick souls(are).
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